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VENUE AND SERVICE OF PROCESS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS-SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
EDWARD L BARRETT, JR.*

In prescribing the rules governing the place of trial of actions commenced in the federal district courts, Congress might reasonably have
been expected to follow one of two courses. On the one hand, it
might have treated the continental United States as a single jurisdiction. On this basis service of process would have been permitted
throughout the United States, venue rules would have been designed
to channel litigation into the most convenient district, and provision
would have been made for a motion for change of venue to be granted
whenever the suit was commenced in a district which did not have
venue. On the other hand, Congress might have treated the individual
federal districts as independent states. On this basis service of
process would have been restricted to the district in which suit was
brought, but venue of transitory actions would have been made proper
in any district in which the defendant could be found for service of
process. In fact, of course, Congress has adopted neither of these alternatives. Instead it has limited venue to the residence of all the defendants or, in diversity cases, all the plaintiffs while at the same
time confining service of process to the boundaries of the state in
which the district court is located.
The result has been a system which narrows access to the federal
courts by criteria which appear to have little in the way of either
theoretical or practical justification. The plaintiff may be excluded
from suing in the federal courts because service of process is not
possible in any district where the venue is proper. In actions where
multiple defendants residing in different states are involved there
may be no district where the venue is proper for complete disposition
of the. controversy. The definition of venue solely in terms of residence of the parties in some situations gives the plaintiff a wide
choice of venue which is subject to abuse and in other situations
gives him such a narrow choice that he is prevented from choosing
the district most convenient for trial of the case. The attempt to
channel actions into more convenient districts by permitting transfer
of actions for convenience of parties and witnesses has given to defendants a delaying weapon which itself is subject to abuse and has
created many difficult choice of law problems for the federal courts
wherever state law is relevant.
A complete review and overhauling of the federal venue-process
* Professor

of Law, University of California, School of Law, Berkeley.
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rules is long overdue.' This article will attempt to present a starting
point from which such a revision might proceed and will be divided
as follows: (1) A brief sketch of the historical development of the
present rules; (2) an analysis of the general venue and process
provisions; (3) an analysis of the special venue and process statutes;
and (4) general suggestions for legislative revision. The discussion
is limited to the rules governing private civil litigation, with primary
2
emphasis on personal actions.
HISTORIcAL DEVELOPMENT 3
The basic outlines of the present system have remained substantially
unchanged since the Judiciary Act of 1789. 4 That act appeared to
adopt the second alternative suggested above and to treat the various
judicial districts as separate jurisdictions. It was construed as confining service of process to the boundaries of the district in which
the action was commenced. But the venue grant was broad enough
to permit suit wherever service of process could be had: in civil
suits against "an inhabitant of the United States" suit was permitted
in the district "whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be
found at the time of serving the writ." This broad grant of venue
was drastically limited, however, with respect to the largest class
of cases within the jurisdiction of the federal courts-those based on
diversity of citizenship. As to those the act provided for jurisdiction
where "the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is
brought, and a citizen of another State." In diversity cases, then,
jurisdiction was limited to the districts of residence of the plaintiff
or of the defendant whether or not service of process was possible
in either of such districts. 6
In 1875 (as a part of the post-Civil War expansion of national power)7 the jurisdictional grants were greatly widened.8 The diversity of
1. For a plea for revision of state venue requirements, see Stevens, Venue
Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MIcH. L. REV. 307 (1951). See
generally, Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 HARv. L. REV. 1217 (1930),

Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment,
44 HARv. L. REV. 41 (1930).

2. No consideration has been given to the problems raised when either
the Government or an alien is a party.
3. See generally FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BusNESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1928); MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 31-67 (1949);
Blume, Place of Trial in Civil Cases, 48 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29-40 (1949).
4. 1 STAT. 73, 78 (1789).

5. See Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619, 622, 45 Sup. Ct.
621, 69 L. Ed. 1119 (1925).
6. Kitchen v. Strawbridge, 14 Fed. Cas. 692, No. 7,854 (C.C. Pa. 1821);

White v. Fenner, 29 Fed. Cas. 1015, No. 17,547 (C.C.D.R.I. 1818); Shute v.
Davis, 22 Fed. Cas. 57, No. 12,828 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817); see Comment, 60
YALE L. J. 183, 186 n.19 (1951).
7. FRANKFURTER Aim LANDIS,

(1928).
8. 18 STAT. 470 (1875).
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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 7

citizenship grant was rephrased to refer to controversies "between
citizens of different States," eliminating the requirement that one
of the parties must be a citizen of the state where the suit was
brought. The federal courts were for the first time given a general
grant of jurisdiction of all suits "arising under the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority." The venue provision was left undisturbed:
venue was proper in any district where the defendant was an "inhabitant" or "in which he shall be found." Hence under this statute,
and for both diversity and federal question cases, the district courts,
like the courts of the states in which they sat, could hear any transitory action within their jurisdiction so long as service of process
could be made within the'district
Twelve years later, however, Congress (as part of an effort to cut
down on the flood of cases coming to the federal courts as a result of
the Civil War amendments and related legislation)1 0 sharply narrowed
federal venue provisions. The Act of March 3, 1887, as corrected by
the Act of August 13, 1888, provided that no civil suit shall be brought
against "any person" in "any other district than that whereof he is
an inhabitant, but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact
that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be
brought only in the district of residence of either the plaintiff or
the defendant."'1 The effect of this, of course, was to re-enact the
pre-1875 jurisdictional limitation in diversity cases as a venue requirement and to limit the venue in federal question cases to the
district of residence of the defendant. And in 1890 the venue grant.
was further narrowed by a judicial construction of the act as requiring that all the plaintiffs or all the defendants, as the case might be,
had to be residents of the district even though they all might be
subject to service of process within the district of residence of one
of them.12
The venue-process scheme established by the 1888 Act was incorporated into the Judicial Code of 191113 and carried without sub9. A preliminary search discloses no cases on this point decided under
the 1875 Act.
10. See FRANKURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit, supra note 7, c. II; Camp v. Gress,
250 U.S. 308, 311, 39 Sup. Ct. 478, 63 L. Ed. 997 (1919).
11. 25 STAT. 433 (1888).
12. Smith v. Lyon, 133 U.S. 315, 10 Sup. Ct. 303, 33 L. Ed. 635 (1890). This
case involved multiple plaintiffs but suggested that the same rule would
apply as to multiple defendants. It was generally applied by the lower federal

courts to both plaintiff and defendant situations. The Supreme Court itself

did not decide a multiple defendant case until Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308,
39 Sup. Ct. 478, 63 L. Ed. 997 (1919), in which it reaffirmed the rule of
Smith v. Lyon.
13. Judicial Code § 51 was the principal section. 36 STAT. 1101 (1911), 28
U.S.C.A. § 112 (1940). The law up to 1928 is discussed in DoM, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL JURISDICTION ANM PROCEDURE, c. 5 (1928).
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stantial change until the Judicial Code of 1948.14 There were during
this period, however, several liberalizing developments. A number
of special statutes were passed providing broader access to the federal
courts for certain types of federal question cases. Some of these, such
as the one governing patent infringement suits,' 5 were included in
the Judicial Code while others, such as the one governing suits under
the Federal Employers Liability Act,'0 appeared only with the related
substantive legislation. In 1938 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
clarified in major part the previously cloudy rules governing the
manner of service of process 17 and Rule 4(f) expressly permitted
service of process throughout the state in which the district of suit
was located.' 8 In 1939 the venue of actions in which corporations were
defendants was greatly expanded by the Supreme Court decision in
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.'0 As a result of that
decision (which left a host of unsolved problems in its wake) 20 a
corporation could in general be sued in a district court in any state in
which it had filed with the state a consent to service of process on
the theory that such a consent was pro tanto a waiver of federal
venue requirements.
The Judicial Code of 194821 did not constitute a thoroughgoing
revision of the rules governing venue and service of process. Instead
it was "a conservative revision" that avoided "large controversial
changes" but made changes of substance "within the general framework of the judicial system. 2- 2 No changes of substance were made
relating to service of process and one of the principal consultants for
the Code has described the changes with respect to venue as follows:
"The general framework of venue is also left undisturbed. But following the trend of the Neirbo case, although not building upon its
14. Title 28, U.S.C.
15. 36 STAT. 1100 (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 109 (1940).
16. 36 STAT. 291 (1910), as amended, 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C.A. §
56 (1940).
17. In actions at law the federal courts prior to 1938 followed in general
the local state practice as to the forms of process and the method of service.
In actions in equity uniform provisions for the form and service of process
were made for all federal courts by the equity rules. See DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 591, 690, (1928). Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides both the form and method of service in
all actions in the federal courts. Rule 4(d)

(7)

adds that service will also

be proper if done in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which
the action is brought.
18. "All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within
the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held and, when
a statute of the United States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of
that state. A subpoena may be served within the territorial limits provided
in Rule 45." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
19. 308 U.S. 165, 60 Sup. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167 (1939).
20. See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2124 (2d ed. 1948); Comment, 42 ILL.
L. REV. 780 (1948).
STAT. 869 (1948).
MOORE, COMMEN TARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE

21. 62
22.

72 (1949).
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principle of waiver, a corporate defendant is treated as a resident,
for purposes of venue, of any judicial district in which it can be
found. Transfer to a proper venue is provided as an alternative to
dismissal where venue is laid improperly; and transfer, not dismissal
gives due recognition
to another proper and more convenient venue
23
to the doctrine of forum non conveniens."
This brief historical review makes it clear that Congress has not
attempted to re-examine the entire framework of federal venue and
process rules in order to see if they are working satisfactorily under
modern conditions. Rules devised in horse and buggy days have been
perpetuated in the days of the airplane and the telephone. We turn
now to seeing how these rules work in practice.
THE GENERAL VENUE

Am

PROCESS PROVISIONS

(1) Single Plaintiff v. Single Defendant:
(a) Individuals. Consider first the simple situation where a single
individual plaintiff is suing a single individual defendant. If the
jurisdiction is based solely upon diversity of citizenship, the venue
is proper in either the district where the plaintiff resides or the district
where the defendant resides. 24 If the jurisdiction is based in whole
or in part on the presence of a case which "arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States," the venue is limited
to the district where the defendant resides. 25 In either diversity or
federal question cases, the plaintiff must, of course, not only select
a district with proper venue but also be able to effect service of
process upon the defendant within the state in which the district
of suit lies.
These venue provisions based solely on residence of the parties
frequently force the plaintiff to commence his action in a district
which is a very inconvenient place for trial. For example, suppose
that a San Francisco plaintiff has a cause of action against a New
York City defendant. The cause of action arose in Chicago and the
relevant witnesses, records, etc., are located there. If the cause of
action is solely one of state law, the plaintiff can sue the defendant
in the northern district of California if he can secure service of process
in California. If service is not possible in California, or if the cause
of action is one arising under federal law, the plaintiff may sue only
in the southern district of New York. Unless the defendant consents,
23. Id. at 74.

24. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(a) (1950).

25. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (b) (1950). Neither legislative history nor decisions
reveal the reason why the venue was made more restricted in federal question

than in diversity cases. See HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 949 (1953). Venue in either diversity or federal question

cases when removed from a state court is fixed at "the district or division embracing the place" where the suit is pending. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (a) (1950).
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the plaintiff may not have the suit tried in the more convenient
Illinois, even if the defendant is subject to service
northern district of
26
of process there.
For a time it was thought that in the common situation where the
plaintiff's cause of action arose out of an automobile accident in Illinois
he might be able to sue in the northern district of Illinois on the theory
that under the local nonresident motorists act the defendant by driving
on the highways of Illinois waived not only the requirement of
27
personal service of process in the state but also federal venue.
However, in Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R. 28 the Supreme Court
rejected this theory and a nonresident motorists act is now of assistance to the plaintiff in the federal courts only when he is injured
in the state of his residence and needs to rely on it for service of
process reasons.
Another possibility was that the plaintiff could take advantage of
the transfer provision in Section 1404 (a) of the Judicial Code 29 to
bring the action to Chicago by way of New York. The theory here
was that the plaintiff could file his suit in the southern district of New
York, obtain service of process in New York, and then move to transfer for "the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice." 30 While the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on this question, all indications are that the plaintiff will not be permitted to use
Section 1404 (a) for this purpose. Initially, there is the doubt whether
the plaintiff may move for a transfer under 1404 (a) in any situation
-at least one district court 3' has held that 1404(a) is wholly a
26. The most recent Supreme Court case reaffirming the right of the defendant to insist on trial in the state of his residence even though the accident
occurred in another state is Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 74
Sup. Ct. 83 (1953), 7 VAND. L. REV. 414 (1954).
27. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcs 2128 (2d ed. 1948) contains a flat statement
to that effect. Most district courts faced with the problem have so ruled. See
Falter v. Southwest Wheel Co., 109 F. Supp. 556, 558 (W.D. Pa. 1953) and
cases cited. The Sixth Circuit also held that venue was waived. Olberding
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 201 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1953). The First and Third Circuits
ruled contra. Martin v. Fischbach Trucking Co., 183 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1950);
McCoy v. Siler, 205 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1953). See also 4 VAND. L. REV. 698 (1951).
28. 346 U.S. 338, 74 Sup. Ct. 83 (1953). The Court limited the Neirbo rule to
situations in which there had been an "actual consent" by the defendant.
Justices Reed and Minton dissented.
29. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (1950).
30. For expositions of this theory, see Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal
Forum, 60 HARv. L. REv. 908, 934 (1947); Keeffe et al, Venue and Removal
Jokers inthe New Federal Judicial Code, 38 VA. L. REV. 569 (1952); 60 YALE
L.J. 183 (1951).
31. Barnhart v. John B. Rogers Producing Co., 86 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ohio
1949). Contra: McCarley v. Foster-Milburn Co., 89 F. Supp. 643 (W.D.N.Y.
1950), rev'd on other grounds by mandamus sub. noam. Foster-Milburn Co.
v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950). In other cases plaintiff's motion has
been considered or granted without explicit consideration of his right to
make the motion. Kostamo v. Brorby, 95 F. Supp. 806 (D. Neb. 1951); Otto v.
Hirl, 89 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. Iowa 1950). See Kaufman, Observations on Transfers under Section 1404(a) of the New Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595, 603
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defendant's remedy as is the doctrine of forum non conveniens from
which it was derived.3 2 And beyond this, several courts of appeal,
assuming arguendo a right by the plaintiff to move for transfer, have
held that such a transfer may be only to a district where the venue
is proper and the defendant subject to service of process. 3 Only such
a district, they reason, is one where the action "might have been
brought" within the meaning of the section. 34 Hence if these cases
are upheld, as seems likely, the plaintiff will receive at most the
privilege of moving to transfer to a district in which he could have
commenced his suit initially.
The defendant, however, appears to have a much broader power
to determine the place of trial by use of a motion to transfer under
Section 1404(a). The lower federal courts (no case has yet reached
the Supreme Court) have not imposed venue and service of process
limitations upon the choice of a district to which to transfer the
case on motion of the defendant. Since the defendant can waive both
venue and service of process limitations, these courts have reasoned
that the action "might have been brought" within the meaning of
1404 (a) in any district in which the defendant would allow the suit
to proceed. 35 Hence in the hypothetical situation outlined above if
the plaintiff brought suit in either the New York or California
(1951); Note, 64

REV. 95 (1950).

HARv. L. REV. 1347,

1348 (1951); Comment, 24 So.

CALIF. L.

32. The Reviser's notes to § 1404(a) stated, in part: "Subsection (a) was
drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, permitting
transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue is proper."
See generally Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L.
REV. 380 (1947); Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HA1IV. L. REV.
908 (1947); Note, 51 COL. L. REV. 762 (1951).

33. Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950); FosterMilburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950); Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
v. Davis, 185 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1950). These decisions are criticized in Keeffe
et al, Venue and Removal Jokers in the New Federal Judicial Code, 38 VA. L.
REv. 569 (1952), and 60 YALE L.J. 183 (1951). See also Kaufman, Observations
on Transfers under Section 1404 (a) of the New Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595,
602 (1951); Note, 64 HAav. L. REV. 1347 (1951).

34. Ithas also been suggested that 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406 (a) (1950) providing
for a transfer of cases brought ina district of improper venue "to any district
or division inwhich it could have been brought" would enable the plaintiff
to avoid the service of process (though not venue) limitations. Wechsler,
FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of the JudicialCode, 13 LAw & CONTEmP.
PROB. 216, 238 (1948) ("If this means what itsays, a plaintiff need only file
in any district where the process can be served and sit back to await the
transfer of the cause."). However, itwould seem that the decisions limiting
transfers by plaintiffs under § 1404(a) to districts where the defendant could
be served with process because of the "might have been brought" language

of that section would be equally applicable to § 1406(a) because of its
"could have been brought" language.
35. Paramount Pictures v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 953 (1951); Anthony v. RKO Radio Pictures, 103 F. Supp. 56 (S.D.N.Y.
1951); but cf. Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 107 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Wash.

1952); Hampton Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 90 F.
Supp. 645 (D.D.C. 1950). See also Note, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1347, 1351 (1951); 50
MIcn. L. REv. 347 (1951); 30 TEXAs L. REv. 256 (1951).
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districts, the trial court would have discretion to transfer the case
to the Illinois district on motion of the defendant even though the
defendant were not otherwise subject to service of process in
Illinois.
This venue-process scheme is subject to criticism on several grounds.
First, it gives a substantial advantage to the defendant in all those
situations in which the most convenient district for trial of the
cause is one where the venue is improper or where the defendant
is not subject to service of process. The plaintiff has no opportunity
either to bring the suit initially in the most convenient federal forum
or to transfer the case thereto. The defendant, however, is given the
choice of retaining the action in the district of suit (which may at
times be much less inconvenient to him than to the plaintiff) or
of moving to transfer to the more convenient forum. Second, it
causes unnecessary delay and waste of judicial time by provoking
needless transfers of actions. Whenever the plaintiff is not permitted
to sue directly in the most convenient forum, the waste motion and
expense of suit in the district of residence of one of the parties plus
transfer to the more convenient district is compelled. 36 Third, it
creates unnecessary conflict of laws problems in those situations
where state law is relevant. Whenever the district or districts of
proper venue are not located in the state where all or a substantial
part of the relevant facts giving rise to the cause of action occurred,
the federal courts are faced with difficult problems. If the action is
not transferred, they are forced under the unsatisfactory Kaxon
doctrine 37 to apply the conflict of laws rules of the forum state.
When the action is transferred, the federal courts may be placed in
a serious dilemma as to the law to be applied if the state in which
the action was originally filed would apply a different rule of law
than the state to which the action is transferred. If the law applied
is to be that of the transferee state, then the courts on transfer will
be deciding not only the convenience of parties and witnesses but
may also be deciding the actual outcome of the litigation with36. It has been suggested that a defendant who refuses a written request
to waive his venue and process defenses and appear in the more convenient
forum should be stopped from moving to transfer to that district under §
1404(a). Kaufman, Observation on Transfers under Section 1404(a) of the
New Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595, 604 (1951).

37. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 1020,
85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941), holding that in diversity cases the federal courts must
follow the conflict of laws rules prevailing in the states in which they sit.
See the devastating criticism of the Klaxon case in HART AND WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 633-36 (1953); and cf. Keeffe et al,
Venue and Removal Jokers in the New Federal Judicial Code, 38 VA. L. REv.
569, 575 (1952). See also the recent criticism of Klaxon by Justices Jackson,
Black and Minton, dissenting in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514,
519, 73 Sup. Ct. 856, 97 L. Ed. 1211 (1953).
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out examining the merits.38 But if the law applied is that of the
transferor state, equally unsatisfactory results obtain. As suggested
by the facts of the Headrick case,39 such a rule places the federal
court in the transferee state in the position of applying a different rule
of law than would be applied in the courts of the state in which it
sits in an action which may have arisen within that state. 40
One problem regarding the manner of serving process should also
be mentioned here. The increased mobility of modern times has made
increasingly difficult the task of finding the defendant within the
jurisdiction of suit for personal service of process. What can a plaintiff
in a federal court action do when the defendant is absent for extended
periods from the state of his residence? If the defendant maintains
a "dwelling house or usual place of abode" the plaintiff may be able
to effect service under Federal Rule 4(d) (1)41 by leaving copies of
the summons "with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein." If there is "an agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process" service can be made on
the agent. But if the defendant has no agent and does not maintain
a dwelling house or usual place of abode or if a person of suitable
age and discretion cannot be found residing therein, federal law makes
no direct provision for service of process even for federal question
cases. In such a situation the plaintiff is relegated to finding a valid
state provision for constructive service under the general permission
given in Rule 4(d) (7) for service "in the manner prescribed by the
law of the state in which the service is made for the service of
summons or other like process upon any such defendant in an action
brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state. '4 2 If no such
38. See Note, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1347, 1354 (1951); see Wells v. Simonds
Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 519, 73 Sup. Ct. 856, 97 L. Ed. 1211 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
39. Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950).
A Missouri citizen was injured in a bus accident in California while a passenger on a bus owned by the Santa Fe. During negotiations for a settlement
the California statute of limitations ran. Plaintiff brought suit in a New
Mexico state court. The New Mexico statute of limitations, which the New
Mexico courts would have applied, had not run. The defendant removed
the case to the federal court and moved for a dismissal or a transfer under §
1404(a) to the northern district of California. The district court dismissed
the action. The court of appeals in reversing, held that if a transfer were
ordered, the California district court would be required to apply the New
Mexico statute of limitations. But cf. Reynolds v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 185
F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1950), applying laws of transferee state without any indication
that law of transferor state differed. See Blume and George, Limitations
and the Federal Courts,49 MICH. L. REV. 937, 959-62 (1951).

40. One writer has suggested that the only solution to the dilemma is to
refuse to transfer in any situation in which the law in the transferee state
would be materially different from that in the transferor state. Note 64 HAnv.
L. REv. 1347, 1355 (1951). See also Kaufman, Observations on Transfers under
Section 1404(a) of the New Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595, 600 (1951).
41. See generally 2 MooRu, FEDERAL PRACTICE 927 et seq. (2d ed. 1948).
42. Rule 4(d) (7) has had almost no judicial construction. See 2 MooaE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 943 (2d ed. 1948).
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statute is available, the plaintiff may face long delays in bringing
suit in the federal courts (or even complete denial of his right of
action if it is one within exclusive federal jurisdiction) even though
the defendant is within the United States and at all times subject
43
to service within some federal judicial district.
(b) Corporations.Consider next the situation where a single plaintiff
is suing a single defendant and the defendant is a corporation. Here
the venue grant is much wider. Under Section 1391 (c) the Judicial
Code of 1948 the plaintiff, in either a diversity or federal question
case, will find the venue proper (a) in the district or districts where
the defendant is incorporated, (b) in any district where the defendant
is licensed to do business, and (c) in any district where the defendant
is "doing business."" Under this statute, venue will usually be proper
in the district most convenient for trial of the case. Normally, a
corporation will at least be "doing business" in any district in which
a cause of action arises against it. In fact, the major venue problem 46 where large multi-state corporations are concerned is that the
wide choice given to the plaintiff may be abused by deliberate choice
of an inconvenient district in the hope of obtaining a favorable
settlement. It is to this situation that Section 1404 (a) is directed and
most abuses can be corrected by motions to transfer under that
section. If a plaintiff having access to a convenient district chooses
to sue in an inconvenient one, he is in no position to complain about
the delay and added expense involved in transferring the action
under 1404 (a) .47

43. Other problems are raised by the fact that residence within the meaning
of the venue statutes is generally equated with domicile. See, e.g., King v. Wall
& Beaver St. Corp., 145 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Koons v. Kaiser, 91 F.
Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); but cf. Townsend v. Bucyrus-Erie Corp., 144 F.2d
106 (10th Cir. 1944). Under these decisions a person who lives six months
of the year in one state and six months in another has for purposes of federal
venue only one residence and considerable judicial time may need to be
expended to determine which state is proper. And furthermore it would
seem that no federal court has venue of a federal question case where the
defendant is a United States citizen who resides abroad, even though he
may spend extended periods within the United States subject to service of
process. See Hammerstein v. Lyne, 200 Fed. 165 (W.D. Mo. 1912), holding
that no diversity jurisdiction existed in such a situation since the defendant
was not a citizen of any state. See generally, Reese and Green, That Elusive
Word, "Residence," 6 VAND.L. Rzv. 561 (1953).
44. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(c) (1950).
45. However, there may be problems in the unusual situations where
a corporation's only contact with a state is, e.g., to send through that state
a single truck which gets involved in an accident or a single salesman who
defrauds a customer. Will such isolated acts constitute "doing business"
within the meaning of the venue statute?
46. Aside from the conflict of laws problems discussed supra which are the
same whether corporations or individuals are involved.
47. A frequent motive for suing in a forum distant from the place where
the action arose is to get the advantage of the larger jury verdicts awarded
in metropolitan centers. This has not been considered a sufficient reason
for retaining the suit in the forum of choice. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 510, 67 Sup. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947).
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The most difficult problems in connection with corporate defendants
are those of service of process. Federal Rule 4 (d) (3) provides the
manner in which service of process shall be made: "by delivering
a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing
or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one
authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires,
48
by also mailing a copy to the defendant."' But no general federal
rule or statute deals with the problem of where the corporation may
be served. When the action has been removed after service of process
under state law or when service in an original federal court action
is predicated upon a state statute under Rule 4 (d) (7), the limitations
of the state law upon service would seem to be applicable.4 Thus
if service is made upon an agent appointed under state law to receive
service of process5 ° or upon a state official under a state law providing
that the doing of certain acts within the state shall constitute an
implied consent to such service,51 the limitations of the state statute
and decisions upon such service would seem to be controlling. But
suppose a corporation is "doing business" within the state within
the meaning of Section 1391 (c) and service of process is made within
the state pursuant to Rule 4(d) (3) upon "an officer, a managing or
general agent" of the corporation. Is the service proper only if the
corporation is doing sufficient business to be subject to service under
state law for suit in a state court? Should the due process restrictions
2
upon state court acquisition of personal jurisdiction over corporations"
be thus made applicable to the federal courts? Should a state law
which requires even more extensive local activity by the corporation
than due process demands as a prerequisite to service of process
govern the federal courts? Does it make any difference in answering
these questions whether the basis of jurisdiction in the federal court
is diversity or federal question? Although the issue is by no means
clearly settled, the federal courts appear to be holding that both the
state law and the due process restrictions upon state law are ap48. See generally 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 958 et seq. (2d ed. 1948).
49. Cases so holding include Carlisle v. Kelly Pile & Foundation Corp.,
175 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1949) (state consent statute); Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948) (removed action; opinion by L. Hand). See
also Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 73 Sup. Ct. 900, 97 L.
Ed. 1331 (1953) (removed action).
50. See, e.g., North Butte Mining Co. v. Tripp, 128 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1942),
applying the limitation of a state consent statute to causes of action arising
within the state.
51. E.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Parry Nav. Co., 195 F.2d 372 (5th
Cir. 1952), applying the Texas statute but relying wholly on federal decisions.
52. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 Sup.
Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643,
70 Sup. Ct. 927, 94 L. Ed. 1154 (1950); Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 Sup. Ct. 413, 96 L. Ed. 485 (1952).
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plicable,5 3 at least in diversity cases.54 If these holdings are followed
it means that situations will continue to arise where a corporation
will not be subject to service of process for suits in a federal court
where venue is proper even though a responsible officer of the
corporation may be found in the state for service of process. It also
means a developing confusion resulting from a uniform federal interpretation of "doing business" for purposes of venue existing alongside of 48 varying interpretations of what is sufficient doing business
to permit service of process.55
One other problem relating to corporations is presented in diversity
cases where the plaintiff is a corporation. Should the last clause of
Section 1391 (c) be construed as making the venue proper when a
corporation is plaintiff in any district where the corporation is
licensed to do business or is doing business? On its face, the statute
would seem to so provide, and at least two district courts have so
held.5 6 On the other hand, it is doubtful that the draftsmen of Section
1391 (c) intended to so widen corporate access to the federal courts3 7
and at least one district court has agreed with this view.58
(c) Unincorporated associations.Finally, consider the problems in
the single-plaintiff, single-defendant situation when either plaintiff
or defendant is a partnership or unincorporated association. Here
there is, of course, a preliminary question of capacity to sue and be
53. See, e.g., Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.
1953) (applying state decisions in a diversity case on the basis of the Erie
doctrine even though they were more restrictive than the due process requirements); Canvas Fabricators v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d
485 (7th Cir. 1952) (applying state decisions in a diversity case on basis of
Erie) ; Cole v. Stonhard Co., 12 F.R.D. 508 (N.D.N.Y. 1952) (applying the
state decisions in a diversity case).
In a number of cases the courts appear to have assumed that the due
process restrictions on state power over foreign corporations were the
measure of the federal court's power. See, e.g., French v. Gibbs Corp.,
189 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1951) (opinion by L. Hand in case of diversity action
commenced in federal court with service on chairman of board of directors
of corporation discussing wholly the federal cases imposing due process
limitations upon the states).
"Whether a foreign corporation or other business entity is doing business
in a state is a matter of general, not local law." 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
97 (2d ed. 1948). In Partin v. Mlichaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 514, 542 n.2
(3d Cir. 1953) the court rejects this statement on the theory that the Erie
line of cases compels reference to state law.
54. At least in those federal question cases where special venue and process
statutes are involved the federal courts appear to, be following some notion
of federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333
U.S. 795, 68 Sup. Ct. 855, 92 L. Ed. 1091 (1948) (Clayton Act suit); Kilpatrick
v. Texas & P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948)
(FELA suit).
55. For an excellent and suggestive discussion of the general problem, see
HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTE1M 959 (1953).
56. Hadden v. Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co., 105 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. Ohio
1952); Freiday v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
57. See the discussion of the legislative history in Note, 28 IND. L.J. 256
(1953).
58. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Davenport, 94 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
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sued in its common name. In general, unincorporated associations
have litigating capacity in the federal courts in all federal question
cases and in diversity cases only when they have such capacity by
the law of the state in which the district court is held." Assuming
capacity, however, where is the residence of an unincorporated
association for venue purposes? The general venue statutes do not
cover the problem and the United States Supreme Court has not
ruled directly on the issue. In 1942 the second circuit, in the Sperry
Productsopinion by Judge Learned Hand, held that an unincorporated
association was an "inhabitant" only of the district in which was
located its principal place of business.60 While this decision rested on
a construction of the special venue statute relating to patent infringement suits, it would appear to apply to "residence" within
meaning of the present general venue statute and some lower courts
have so held.6 In this connection it should be noted that the liberalization of the venue provisions with reference to corporations in the
1948 Judicial Code was not duplicated for unincorporated associations. If the Sherry Products case represents the law, then a large
unincorporated association doing business in many states would be
a resident for venue purposes only of the district of its principal
62
place of business.
So long as this limited definition of venue prevails, there will
normally be a question of the availability of the association for service
of process only where the plaintiff in a diversity suit is suing an
unincorporated association in the district of the plaintiff's residence.
In this situation, the law does not make any provision regarding
what is sufficient connection with the state of the district of suit
to permit service. Federal Rule 4 specifies the same manner of service
as provided for corporations. But no answer is given to the question
of what happens when plaintiff in a diversity suit serves in the state
of plaintiff's residence "an officer, a managing or general agent" of
the association. Is it enough that the association is doing business?
Or must it meet the same tests of doing business as a corporation
would? And, as seems to be the law with respect to corporations,
59. FED. R. CiV. P. 17(b); cf. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.,
259 U.S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975 (1922). See the discussion in 3
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1407 (1948).

60. Sperry Products, Inc. v. Association of American Railroads, 132 F.2d
408 (2d Cir. 1942). See generally HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 965 (1953).
61. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Graham, 175
F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Griffin v. Illinois Cent., R.R., 88 F. Supp. 552 (N.D.
I. 1949); Darby v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 73 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
(partnership). See also 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1415 (2d ed. 1948).
62. Of course, in the limited situations in which partnerships and unincorporated associations are required by state law to file consents to service of
process, the Neirbo rule might be applied to find a waiver of venue. See 3
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2129

(2d ed. 1948).
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are those tests supplied by state rather than federal law? On this
problem we have as yet very little judicial assistance.6
(2) Multiple Parties:64
(a) Individuals. The rules governing venue and service of process
combine to close the doors of the federal courts to most cases involving multiple individual litigants residing in different states. If, for
example, a New York plaintiff desires to join in one action in the
federal courts two defendants, one residing in California and the
other in Illinois, he must first be able to secure service of process upon
both the defendants within a single state. If he is able to get over
that hurdle and secure personal jurisdiction, he then faces the venue
limitations. If the jurisdiction is based in part on the presence of a
federal question, there will be no federal district court in which the
venue is proper since the statute provides that the suit may be
brought "only" in the district "where all defendants reside." 65 If
jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship, venue will be
proper in New York (the residence of the plaintiff) and if the plaintiff
has been fortunate enough to achieve service of process there on both
defendants, the case may go on. Of course, if two plaintiffs are involved, one residing in New York and the other in New Jersey (or
even one residing in Buffalo and one residing in New York City), then
there will not be any federal district of proper venue for even the
diversity case since no district may be found "where all plaintiffs
or all defendants reside." 66
These irrational limitations have the effect of keeping out of the
federal courts those cases which they are best qualified to handle-the
very cases with which the state courts cannot satisfactorily deal.
Where the parties necessary to the complete determination of a
controversy reside in different states, it is probably the unusual
situation in which the courts of any one state can obtain personal
jurisdiction of all the parties. At best this requires the expense both
to the parties and to the courts of piecemeal litigation of a unitary
controversy. At worst, where indispensable parties are involved, it
may mean that no court will have jurisdiction to adjudicate any
63. Kaffenberger v. Kremer, 63 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Pa. 1945) suggests that
the tests for unincorporated associations and partnerships are the same as
for corporations. Cf. Western Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 42

F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Iowa 1941). See HART

AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS

966 (1953). 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 967 (2d ed.
1948) is not helpful on this problem.
64. See generally the very detailed treatment of this problem in 3 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 2115-43 (2d ed. 1948).
65. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b) (1950); cf. Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308, 39 Sup.
Ct. 478, 63 L. Ed. 997 (1919). This strict rule is modified slightly by the provisions of § 1392(a): "Any civil action, not of a local nature, against defendants residing in different districts in the same State, may be brought
in any of such districts." See also § 1393(b).
66. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(a) (1950).
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
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portion of the controversy. Should not, then, the federal courts, which
are national courts established by Congress, be empowered to hear
these cases? Certainly, where the case is one arising under federal
law, some federal court should be empowered to bring before it all
the parties necessary to a complete determination of the controversy.
And it is a patently ridiculous result that where indispensable parties
to a federal controversy reside in different states within the United
States no court, not even a federal court, may settle the controversy.
Even where the jurisdiction is based on diversity, the argument for
opening the federal courts to determination of cases where multiple
parties reside in different states appears irrefutable.07 Whatever may
be the objections to diversity jurisdiction in other situations, here
only the federal courts can do complete justice to the parties. Thus
in this situation in which there is unquestionable justification for
opening the federal courts to the determination of controversies based
wholly on state law, the venue and process limitations close their
doors.68

(b) Corporations.The venue and process rules are, of course, much
less likely to close -the doors of the federal courts where multiple
corporate defendants are involved. The broad provision in Section
1391 (c) that for venue purposes any judicial district in which a
corporation "is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing
business" "shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation"
makes it likely that some state will be found in which all the
corporate defendants reside.6 9 And since, as pointed out above, the
corporations will in most instances also all be subject to service of
process in such state, the case may be heard there. There will, of
course, be a residuum of cases in which a joint residence cannot be
found under even these broad rules and in which service of process
may not be obtained within a single state. In these cases, the problems are the same as those discussed above for individuals.
The question raised above whether the last clause of Section
1391 (c) applies to corporations as plaintiffs is involved here, also.
If it does apply, then in diversity cases corporati6ns incorporated
in different states can join as plaintiffs and establish venue in a
particular district when they are all doing business or licensed to
do business in that district.
67. Cf. HART m WEcEsLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS Am =E FEDERAL SySTEM
897 (1953).
68. Since under the rule of Sperry Products, Inc. v. Association of American
Railroads, 132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942), discussed supra, partnerships and
unincorporated associations have only one place of residence for venue purposes, the multiple party problems are the same with respect to them as
with respect to individuals and will not be separately discussed.
69. See 3 MOoRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2142 (2d ed. 1948).

19541

VENUE AND SERVICE OF PROCESS
SPECIAL VENUE AND PROCESS PROVISIONS

In a number of special situations Congress has recognized that
the general venue and process rules are too restrictive and has
provided special rules for cases arising under particular federal
statutes. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long held that the
general venue statutes do not apply to suits in Admiralty--defendants
in such cases may be sued in any district wherein they can be found
for service of process. 7° As a result of these two developments, a
substantial portion of the federal question cases do not fall under
the general statutes.
(1) Personal actions:
The special statutes governing private litigation are of four general
types. First are the statutes which broaden the venue grant without
making any special rules for service of process. Most important of
these (in terms of the amount of litigation affected) is the Federal
Employers Liability Act which provides that suit may be brought "in
the district of residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of
action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at
the time of commencing such action."7' Since FELA actions are
brought normally against a single railroad corporation, the effect
of this grant of venue is to permit suit in almost any district where
the defendant is subject to service of process. Other important examples are the Sherman Act provision that in treble damage actions
against individual defendants the suit may be brought "in the district
in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent," 72 and
the provision that suits arising under the acts relating to copyrights
"may be instituted in the district in which the defendant or his agent
resides or may be found." 73 The Jones Act also slightly broadens the
general venue statutes by its provision that suit may be brought in
the district "in which the defendant employer resides or in which
his principal office is located.7 4
Second are the statutes which in addition to broadening the venue
requirements provide special rules governing service of process to
insure that process may be served wherever venue is proper. In patent
infringement actions venue is placed where the defendant resides, or
where he has committed acts of infringement and has a regular
and established place of business. 7 5 Then it is provided that when
70. Ex parte Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488, 10 Sup. Ct. 587, 33 L.
Ed. 991 (1890); cf. Brown v. C. D. Mallory & Co., 122 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1941).
71. 35 STAT. 66 (1908), as amended, 62 STAT. 989, 45 U.S.C.A. § 56 (Supp.
1953).
72. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1951).
73. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(a) (1950).
74. 38 STAT. 1185 (1915), as amended, 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. §
688 (1944).
75. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b) (1950).
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the suit is started where the defendant is not a resident but has a
regular and established place of business, service of process may
be made upon defendant's agent or agents conducting such business. 76
Similarly, the Labor Management Relations Act, after giving the
77
federal courts jurisdiction of actions on certain labor contracts,
provides that proceedings by or against a labor organization may be
had in the district in which the organization maintains its principal
office or in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents
78
are engaged in representing or acting for employee members. It
is then provided that service of summons on an officer or agent of
a labor organization in his capacity as such shall constitute service
79
upon the labor organization.
Third are statutes which make a broad grant of venue which would
permit suit in districts where service of process could not be effected
under normal rules and then expressly permit nation-wide service
of process. One of the earliest of these came in the Clayton Act,
where for suits under the antitrust laws against corporations, the
venue was broadened to include the judicial district of which it is an
inhabitant, or where it is found or where it transacts business.80
Then because merely transacting business within a district (which
would make the venue proper) might not be enough to permit service
of process, it was also provided that "all process in such cases may
be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever
it may be found."8' Under this provision, service outside the state
where the suit was brought is permitted.8 2 Similarly the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 provide that private
suits to enforce liabilities created by the Acts "may be brought in
the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or
transacts business, or in the district where the sale took place, if the
defendant participated therein, and process in such cases may be
served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant
or wherever the defendant may be found." 83 A similar provision
is also contained in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.84 None
76. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1694 (1950).
77. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A& § 185(a) (Supp. 1953). Section 185(b)

establishes the capacity of the labor organizations to sue and be sued. See
Note, 7 VAxo. L. REV. 374 (1954).

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
Sup.

61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(c) (Supp. 1953).
61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(d) (Supp. 1953).
38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 22 (1951).
Ibid.
See United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 809, 68
Ct. 855, 92 L. Ed. 1091 (1948).
83. 48 STAT. 86 (1933), as amended, 63 STAT. 107 (1949), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77v
(1951) (Securities Act); 53 STAT. 1175 (1939), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77vvv (1951)
(Trust Indenture Act); see Stella v. Kaiser, 82 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)
holding valid service of process in California in a New York suit.
84. 48 STAT. 902 (1934), as amended, 63 STAT. 107 (1949), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa
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of these statutes, however, provide directly for the multiple party
problem. Venue must still be proper in the district court for all
defendants joined, even though service of process is effected else-

where.8 5 Of course, the very broad venue grants eliminate most of
the problem-for example, in the Securities Act where as to all
defendants who participated in a forbidden sale of securities the

district of the sale is made proper venue, or the Securities and Exchange Act where the district "wherein any act or transaction con-

stituting the violation occurred" is apt to provide a common venue
for all defendants likely to be joined.
Fourth are the statutes in which Congress has faced squarely the
multiple party problem. The most significant of these, probably,
relates to interpleader. Here venue is established in the judicial
district where one or more of the claimants reside 6 and service of
process is authorized outside the state to bring in the outside
claimants.8 7 A more limited provision is made for shareholders' suits.
Venue is fixed in any district where the corporation might have
sued the same defendants~s and then service beyond that district
is permitted to bring the corporation into court.8 9 Another provision
is found in the Interstate Commerce Commission Act. In suits by
shippers against water carriers to recover on awards of damages
made by the Commission, it is provided that all parties who have
been involved in a single Commission order may be joined as plaintiffs or defendants "and such suit may be maintained by such joint
plaintiffs and against such joint defendants in any district where any
one of such joint plaintiffs could maintain such suit against any one
of such joint defendants; and service of process against any one of
such defendants as may not be found in the district where the suit
is brought may be made in any district where such defendant has
his or its principal operating office."90

The Judicial Code of 1948 raised two problems with respect to
these special venue statutes. The first of these to arise was the
question whether the new transfer provisions in Section 1404 (a) and

1406 (a) applied to suits governed by special venue provisions which
(1951); see Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (upholding

service of process outside the state).
85. In Government prosecutions under the Sherman and Clayton Acts express provision is made for the multiple party situation and if the action is
brought at the residence of one of the parties the court may order all others

served and brought in regardless of their residence. 26 STAT. 210 (1890), 15
U.S.C.A. § 5 (1951); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct.
502, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911). No similar provision is made for private litigation.
86. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1397 (1950).
87. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2361 (1950).
88. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (1950).
89. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1695 (1950).
90. 54 STAT. 940 (1940), as amended, 63 STAT. 281 (1949), 49 U.S.C.A. §

908(g) (1951); cf. id. § 908(e).
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were not located in the Judicial Code. The Supreme Court has held
that Section 1404 (a) is applicable to, FELA and antitrust actions.0 1
The reasoning used would indicate a similar result would be reached
with respect to other special venue statutes and to Section 1406 (a).
The second question is the more difficult one and has yet to be resolved
by the Supreme Court. Does the provision of Section 1391 (c) that
the district in which a corporation is incorporated or licensed to do
business or is doing business "shall be regarded as the residence of
such corporation for venue purposes" apply to special venue statutes?
With respect to most of the special venue statutes, an affirmative answer will have little effect since they *already fix venue in terms of
where the defendant may be found or is doing business. In some cases,
however, a substantial change would be effected. Patent infringement
actions may be brought outside the defendant's residence only where
he has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business. 92 Application of the definition of residence
from Section 1391 (c) would mean -that corporate defendants would
be suable wherever doing business or licensed to do business without
regard to whether acts of infringement had been committed within
the district. Lower federal courts have been divided on this issue.08
Some broadening would be involved in the venue for interpleader
actions. If one of the claimants were a corporation, venue would then
be proper wherever that corporation was doing business or licensed
to do business. Venue under the Jones Act would be widened by
application of this provision-for under it the defendant if a corporation would be suable wherever doing business or licensed to do business instead of only where incorporated or where its principal office
is located. Several district courts have held Section 1391 (c) applicable
to Jones Act cases.9 4
91. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69 Sup. Ct. 944, 93 L. Ed. 1207 (1949)
(FELA action); Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pacific By., 337 U.S. 75, 69 Sup. Ct.
953, 93 L. Ed. 1223 (1949) (same); United States v. National City Lines, Inc.,
337 U.S. 78, 69 Sup. Ct. 955, 93 L. Ed. 1226 (1949) (anti-trust action); see
Notes, 37 CAL=F. L. REV. 697 (1949), 28 N.C.L. REV. 100 (1949).
92. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b) (1950); see generally Notes, 21 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 610 (1953), 47 N.W.L. REV. 699 (1952).
93. Upholding the application of § 1391 (c) to § 1400 (b), see Dalton v. Shakespeare Co., 196 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1952); Farr Co. v. Gratiot, 92 F. Supp. 320
(S.D. Cal. 1950). Rejecting the application of § 1391(c) to § 1400(b), see
C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. Barnes, 194 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1952); Gulf
Research and Development Co. v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp.: 92 F.
Supp. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1950). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
C-O-Two Fire Co. case but affirmed the judgment below by an equally divided
Court without opinion. Cardox Corp. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 344
U.S. 861, 73 Sup. Ct. 102, 97 L. Ed. 668 (1952). 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PnAcTIcE
2139, 2140 (2d ed. 1948) asserts that § 1391 (c) was intended to qualify §
1400(b). See also Notes, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 610 (1953), 47 N.W.L. REV.
699 (1952).
94. Phillips v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Bagner
v. Blidberg Rothchild Co., 84 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
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(2) Local actions:
The special situation regarding local actions should also be noted
briefly. The courts have long read into the general venue statutes
an exception for local actions. Ever since Livingston sought to sue
Jefferson in the federal district court in Virginia for trespass to land
in Louisiana, it has been held that residence of the defendant alone
is not enough where local actions are involved.9 5 Such actions must
be brought where the property is. But, apparently, they can be
brought in the district where the property is only if all the defendants
reside in and are subject to service of process in that district 6
Exception to these very restrictive rules is made for certain types
of local actions by Section 1655 of the Judicial Code.97 If the action
is one "to enforce any lien upon or claim to, or to remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to real or personal property
within the district," then the suit may be brought without regard to
the residence of the defendants. Any defendants that are not subject
to service of process within the state of suit may be brought into
the action by personal service outside the state, or, if that be not
practicable, by publication. If the absent defendant does not appear,
the judgment can affect only property which is the subject of the
action;9 8 if he does appear to contest on the merits even the in rem
portion of the proceedings, however, he subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the court to render a personal judgment. 99
SUGGESTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE REVISION
It would be premature to present a detailed draft of proposed
changes in the federal venue and process rules. Instead, general
suggestions will be made as to the types of changes which might be
made to remove the major defects in the present rules.
95. Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105, 15 Sup. Ct. 771, 39 L.
Ed. 913 (1895); Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. 660, No. 8,411 (C.C.D.
Va. 1811); see Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66, 67, 26 L. Ed. 52 (1880); Blume,
Actions Quasi in Rem under Section 1655, Title 28, U.S.C., 50 MicH. L. REv. 1,
28 (1951); but cf. Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 220 Ark. 521, 249 S.W.2d 994
(1952), 6 VAN. L. REV. 786 (1953).
96. Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co., 179 Fed. 245 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1910),
af'd, 218 U.S. 357 (1910). In HART An WECHSLER, TE FEDEAm COuRTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYsTEM 955 (1953) it is noted that no Supreme Court decision has
directly held that a nonresident defendant could not be sued in a local
action in the district where the property was.
97. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1655 (1950). The cases are discussed in Blume, Actions
Quasi in Rem under Section 1655, Title 28, U.S.C., 50 MIcE. L. Buv. 1 (1951);
HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 952-57
(1953).

98. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1655 (1950).
99. Campbell v. Murdock, 90 F. Supp. 297 (D. Ohio 1950); see 2 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 2264 (2d ed. 1948); Blume, Actions Quasi in Rem Under
Section 1655, Title 28, U.S.C., 50 MicH. L. REV. 1, 22; but cf. McQuillen v.
National Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940); 51 CoL. L. REv. 242
(1951).
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(1) Venue:
As pointed out above, the chief defects in the present general
venue statutes are two. First, the definition of venue solely in terms
of the residence of the parties forces plaintiffs to commence many
actions away from the districts most convenient for trial and thus
promotes unnecessary transferring of actions. Second, the requirement that all defendants must be residents of the district in which
suit is brought excludes from the federal courts a large share of the
multiple party actions involving individuals residing in different
states despite the fact that only the federal courts are equipped to
handle such actions satisfactorily. Any revision should do something
about these two problems.
Perhaps the best solution to both problems would be to create a
new ground of venue defined in terms more directly related to trial
convenience than is residence of the parties. The principal difficulty
here is one of drafting a statute which is sufficiently specific to avoid
creating extensive and continuing litigation over its application and
yet which will normally place the action in a reasonably convenient
district. Perhaps as close as one can come to achieving this result
would be to adopt a statute similar to that proposed by Dean Stevens
for state practice, providing for venue in any district "in which the
wrongful act, or part thereof, occurred."'10 0 In the generality of cases
a statute of this kind would be sufficiently clear in its application. In
doubtful cases the plaintiff would be able to avoid litigation over
its meaning by commencing his action in the district of residence
of the defendant. Such a statute would normally provide at least
one district in which all parties could be sued. It would in most
instances permit the plaintiff to commence his suit in the district
most convenient for trial of the case and hence avoid transfers and
unnecessary conflict of laws problems. In particular cases it would,
of course, be subject to abuse by opening up to the plaintiff districts
which would be very inconvenient to all or part of the defendants.
This problem will be discussed further in connection with motions
to transfer.
Even with the addition of such a new ground of venue, it would
seem that venue based on residence of the defendant should be retained as an alternative. Convenience to the defendant is an important
consideration in determining the proper district for trial, and his
residence may frequently be the most convenient district.10 ' Two
changes should be made in the present statute, however. The venue
should be made proper in the district where the defendant, or de100. Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 Micui.
REv. 307 (1951).
101. Id. at 311-12.
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fendants, or any one of them resides. 0 2 This change would be desirable
even with the addition of a new ground of venue which permits
joinder of all defendants in some district; it would be essential if
no such new ground is adopted. And special provision should be made
to take care of the venue of actions against partnerships and unincorporated associations. It would seem most realistic to treat such
defendants in approximately the same way that corporations are
treated; hence it is suggested that venue be made proper wherever
they are licensed to do business or are doing business. Again these
changes would have the effect of opening up new choices to the
plaintiff and hence make important the retention of provisions for
transfer of actions. 0 3
Venue based on residence of the plaintiff has little or no relationship to convenience for trial and should be eliminated entirely. The
broad definition of residence where corporate defendants are involved
in Section 1391 (c) eliminated most of the practical justification for
this ground of venue. Provision whereby all defendants may be joined
in a single district even though they do not all reside there will
eliminate any justification which may remain.
(2) Service of Process:
The broadened venue rules suggested above should be implemented
by a general provision for nation-wide service of process. Such service
is now permitted in a limited number of special situations (discussed
above) and no valid reason appears why it should not be made
general. In fact, personal service outside the district would seem
preferable (in terms of insuring that actual notice is received) to
the forms of constructive service and service upon state officials which
may now be permitted through following state practice. Thus in
situations in which a plaintiff is injured in the state of his residence
by a nonresident motorist, present practice permits what is in effect
nation-wide service of process. But instead of direct service upon the
defendant at the state of his residence, the forms must be observed
of service upon a state official who mails the process to the defendant.
Such procedural clumsiness is compelled for actions in the state
courts by due process limitations. 10 4 In the federal courts, however,
102. Such a provision is common in state practice. See the listing of statutes,
id. at 327 n.11l. Professor Bunn has suggested such a change limited to
federal question cases. BuNN, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF
THE

UNITED STATES 118 (5th ed. 1949).

103. Dean Stevens deals at length with the problem of bad faith joinder
of a defendant to control venue where the statute lays venue at the residence
of any one of the defendants and suggests a special statute to permit attack

on the plaintiff's good faith. Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed

Cure, 49 MIcH. L. REv. 307, 329-31, 338 (1951). No such provision would appear
to be needed in federal practice, however, so long as any defendant is permitted
to move for a transfer of the action to a more convenient district.
104. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091
(1927). Also cf. the use of substituted service to bring the out-of-state de-
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there is no constitutional impediment to Congress treating the entire
country as a single jurisdiction and permitting service of process
anywhere within it.10 5 And in terms of sensible administration of
justice, it would seem that the plaintiff should be permitted to commence his suit in the district most convenient for trial of the case and
then serve process upon the defendant wherever he may be found in
the United States.
Uniform and complete federal provisions governing both the manner and place of serving process should be made applicable to all
actions in the federal courts. With nation-wide service of process,
any need for referring to state practice would be eliminated and the
federal provisions could be greatly simplified. With respect to individuals, for example, all normal situations would seem to be covered
by a simple provision like that now contained in Rule 4 for service
"by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him
personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual
place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein."' 06 To cover the unusual situations where the defendant has no usual place of abode and is seeking to evade service
of process, some form of substituted service, for which there are many
models in state practice, 0 7 would need to be provided. With respect
to corporations, partnerships, and unincorporated associations, it
would seem sufficient to limit service to "an officer, a managing or
general agent," such service to be permitted in any district in which
such officer or agent is engaged in the business of his company. With
nation-wide service of process there will always be some state in
which service can be effected upon an officer or agent of the company
and hence there would- no longer be need for service upon statutory
agents in federal court actions.
(3) Transfer of Actions:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses. The liberalized
rules governing venue and service of process suggested above will
open up new possibilities of abuse by plaintiffs in selecting inconvenient forums. To deal with this problem, district courts must retain
the power to transfer actions for -the convenience of parties and
fendant before state courts as illustrated in Mullone v. Central Hanover Bank
and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 Sup. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950).
105. See Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619, 622, 45 Sup. Ct.
621, 69 L. Ed. 1119 (1925) ("Congress has power, likewise, to provide that
the process of every district court shall run into every part of the United
States").
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1). The additional authorization now in the Rule
of service upon "an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process" would not be needed since the defendant would be
somewhere subject to service under the other rules.
107. See e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 412, 413 (1953); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT
§§ 230, 231.
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witnesses and in the interests of justice. Experience with Section
1404 (a) has demonstrated that it is in the main a sufficient protection
of the defendant's interests. In fact, it may have gone further and
given to the defendant a delaying weapon which is subject to as
much abuse as is the plaintiff's choice of venue. And its use has
created many difficult choice of law problems for the federal courts.
Hence, certain revisions would seem to be needed.
First, consideration should be given to the possibility of listing
in the statute the specific factors which are to be considered by the
courts in ruling on motions to transfer. 08 The generality of 1404 (a),
coupled with the difficulty of appellate review, leaves the district
court in each case quite at large in determining the factors to be
considered. This vagueness in turn makes it easier for a defendant
whose motive is delay to move for a transfer and get extended judicial
consideration of his motion. No attempt is made here to draft an
appropriate listing of factors. Such a task can be accomplished only
after both detailed examination of the reported district court decisions
under 1404 (a) 10 9 and careful consideration by a large segment of
the active federal bar.
Second, express provision should be made for motions to transfer
by any single defendant in multiple party situations. If the venue rules
are changed to permit the plaintiff to join all defendants in a single
district no matter where they reside, the district of suit may be convenient for some -defendants, inconvenient for others. In this situation
any defendant should be able to invoke the discretion of the court
to transfer the case to that district which is most convenient for the
parties as a whole. Adoption of the broadened venue rules suggested
above would eliminate any real necessity for motions to transfer
by the plaintiff for convenience of parties and witnesses and hence
the statute should be expressly limited to motions by defendants.
Third, no more than one transfer should be permitted of any action
and all forms of direct appellate review (by appeal or by mandamus)
of orders granting or denying transfer should be eliminated. Review
on appeal from the final judgment would, of course, be open as in
other cases and a reversal would be possible where the standard
of Section 2111 of the Judicial Code could be met by a showing that
the ruling on the motion to transfer did affect the substantial rights
of the parties. The reasons for such limitation of appellate review have
been well stated by Judge Goodrich speaking for the Court of Appeals
108. This suggestion has also been made by Judge Kaufmann, Observations
on Transfers under Section 1404(a) of the New Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595,
608 (1951).
109. See the examination of factors in Notes, 41 CALI. L. REv. 507 (1953),
28 TExAs L. REv. 688 (1950).
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for the Third Circuit sitting en banc:110 "We think that this practice
[of appellate review of orders granting or denying motions to transfer
under 1404(a)] will defeat the object of the statute. Instead of
making the business of the courts easier, quicker and less expensive,
we now have the merits of the litigation postponed while appellate
courts review the question where a case may be tried.
"Every litigant against whom the transfer issue is decided naturally
thinks the judge was wrong. It Is likely that in some cases an
appellate court would think so, too. But the risk of a party being
injured either by the granting or refusal of a transfer order is, we
think, much less than the certainty of harm through delay and
additional expense if these orders are to be subjected to interlocutory
review by mandamus.
"We do not propose to grant such a review where the judge in
the district court has considered the interests stipulated in the
statute and decided thereon....
"We realize that the view we express is not the one which some
of our judicial brethren are following with regard to this statute."'
But we cannot escape the conclusion that it will be highly unfortunate
if the result of an attempted procedural improvement is to subject
parties to two lawsuits: first, prolonged litigation to determine the
place where a case is to be tried; and, second, the merits of the al'
leged cause of action itself." 2"
Fourth, there must be a statutory abrogation of the rule of Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Ele'ctric Mfg. Co." 3 There are, of course, many reasons,
beyond the scope of this paper, for permitting the federal courts to
develop their own conflict of laws rules applicable to all federal court
actions." 4 Here, it is enough to indicate that as long as the Klaxon
110. All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011-12 (1952).
111. See, e.g., Dairy Industries Supply Ass'n v. La Buy, 207 F.2d 554 (7th
Cir. 1953); Wiren v. Laws, 194 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Shapiro v. Bonanza
Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181
F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950); Gulf Research & Development Co. v. Harrison, 185
F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1950); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Davis, 185 F.2d 766
(5th Cir. 1950); Ford J~ptor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950). These cases are discussed and approved in 39
VA. L. REV. 105 (1953). See also Kaufman, Observations on Transfers under
Section 1404(a) of the New Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595 (1951).
112. In a recent case the Supreme Court has held that mandamus is not
available to review an order of transfer under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406 (a) (1950).
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 74 Sup. Ct. 145 (1953).
The Court reasoned that writs of mandate could not be used as substitutes
for an appeal, that they were available only when the trial court was exceeding its jurisdiction. In ruling on a motion to transfer, the Court said that
a trial judge was clearly acting within his jurisdiction. This reasoning would
seem to control actions under § 1404 (a) also.

113. 313 U.S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 734, 85 L. Ed. 1115 (1941); see Braucher,

The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARv. L. REv. 908, 937 (1947).
114. See, e.g., HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 633-36 (1953); Cook, The Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws,
36 ILL. L. REV. 493 (1942); cf. the criticism of Klaxon by Justices Jackson,
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rule prevails the whole scheme for transferring actions between dis-

tricts breaks down whenever state law is relevant and different rules
would be applied by the state courts of the transferor and transferee
forums. Free transfer of actions in order to insure trial at the most
convenient forum is possible only if all federal courts follow the
same conflict of laws rules and hence will apply the same law to any
particular action.
(b) Where wrong venue laid. Even under liberalized venue rules
there will be situations where the plaintiff inadvertently selects a
district where the venue is improper. This situation is now taken
care of by the provision in Section 1406(a) that the court "shall
dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to
any district or division in which it could have been brought." This
statute is deficient, however, in not providing any standards for
determining to which district the transfer shall be made when
there are several in which the action "could have been brought."
The only relevant standards would seem to be those of convenience
to parties and witnesses which are involved in Section 1404(a)
transfers. Hence, a more sensible provision here would seem to be
something like the following: "The district court of a district in
which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district
shall, on timely and sufficient objection made by the defendant,
transfer the case to any district or division for the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, as provided in
section 1404 (a) ."
(4) Special Venue and Process Provisions:
Adoption of the more liberal venue and process rules suggested
above would eliminate the need for substantially all of the present
special venue and process rules. These statutes have been adopted
in each case to provide more liberal rules than those of the general
statutes. With more liberal rules generally applicable these special
provisions would no longer serve a useful purpose. It may be, however,
that in special situations Congress will want to narrow the broad
general rules." 5 Hence, it would seem that any revision should provide
that unless special exceptions are made all special statutes governing
venue and process are thereby repealed. During the revision process,
each of these statutes should be examined to see if there is special
reason for restricting the broad general rules and, if so, explicit
Black, and Minton, dissenting in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514,
519, 73 Sup. Ct. 57, 97 L. Ed. 634 (1953).

115. See, e.g., the argument that § 1404(a) should not apply to FELA
actions in Black and Black, Injustices in the Federal Forum Non Conveniens
Rule, 3 UTAH L. REV. 314 (1953). The contrary considerations are presented
in Gibson, The Venue Clause and Transportationof Lawsuits, 18 LAW & CoNvTEMP. PROB. 367 (1953); Note, 29 IND. L.J. 97 (1953).
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One specific provision which
provision should be made.
should clearly be made is to clarify the rules governing local actions.
A wise solution would appear to be to expand the coverage of Section
1655 to include all in rem or quasi-in-rem actions, and then provide
that all other actions (whether or not treated as local actions at
common law) shall be governed solely by the general venue and
process statutes. 116 Thus it would seem clear that actions for trespass
to land should be governed by the general statutes and not confined
to the location of the land.
(5) The Diversity of Citizenship Problem:
One immediate objection to the broadened venue and process provisions suggested above will be that they will channel even more
diversity cases into the federal courts with all the conseqiient problems of federal courts dealing with state law issues. This objection
must, it seems to the writer, be met in another way. If the diversity
jurisdiction is thought to be undesirable, 117 it should be directly
eliminated or cut down through amendment to the jurisdictional
statute. The present venue and process rules, as suggested above,
combined with the Strawbridge rule of diversity jurisdiction, 118 have
the effect of keeping out of the federal courts the very cases which
they are better equipped to deal with than the state courts. Hence,
an expansion of venue and process which gives the plaintiff a better
opportunity to bring his action in the most convenient district (thus
reducing the federal judicial burden of transfer or of trial) and
which opens the doors of the federal courts to those cases where
multiple defendants reside in different states and cannot all be brought
before a single state court seems clearly to be desirable.
If this results in too great an expansion of federal judicial business,
thought should be given to a jurisdictional statute which would give
the federal courts jurisdiction of nonfederal question cases in all
those situations and only those situations where there are several
defendants and the defendants reside in different states, even though
one or more of the defendants may reside in the same state as the
plaintiff. Thus in the simple situation where Jones of New York is
suing Smith of Pennsylvania on a state law issue, the litigation would
take place in the state courts. But where Jdnes of New York has
been injured through the joint or concurrent negligence or fraud of
Smith of Pennsylvania and Jensen of Minnesota and Watson of New
116. See the suggestions in Blume, Actions Quasi in Rem under Section
1655, Title 28, U.S.C., 50 MIcH. L. Rnv. 1, 30 (1951).
117. See
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893-97 (1953); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial
Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 234-40 (1948).
118. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267, 2 L. Ed. 435 (U.S. 1806), which
has been interpreted as requiring complete diversity between each plaintiff
and each defendant. See HART
901-02 (1953).
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York, he would be able to join them all for suit in a federal district
court since it might be impossible to get jurisdiction of them all
in any one state court.
(6) The Overall Scheme:
In general, the venue and process provisions suggested here would
result in the following scheme, one which to the writer is far more
logical and simpler of application than our present complex rules."19
The plaintiff will be given a wide choice of venue. He can select
a district where the wrongful act or part thereof occurred or a district
where one or more of the defendants reside. If the defendant is a
partnership or unincorporated association, he will have (as he will
continue to have with respect to corporations) the choice of any
district in which the defendant does business. With these choices
the plaintiff will in most cases be able to select a district which is
reasonably convenient for trial of the case and retain it there without
the expense and delay of transfer. And with nation-wide service of
process, he will be able to get personal jurisdiction of all panties in
any district where venue is proper.
If the plaintiff abuses his wide choice of venue and selects an
inconvenient forum, the defendant will be protected by his right to
invoke the discretion of the court to transfer the case to a district
which is more convenient for trial. Unnecessary delay will be minimized by eliminating the possibility for appellate review of the
order of transfer. Choice of law problems will be minimized by
the development of federal precedents which make the same law
applicable in whatever district the case is tried.
In federal question cases the present restrictions which force many
multiple defendant suits into the state courts will be eliminated and
the plaintiff enabled to bring all proper parties before one district
court. If only the venue and process rules are changed, similar results will obtain in diversity litigation with respect to multiple party
actions within the diversity litigation. If, however, the revision goes
further to deal with jurisdiction, it might bring into the federal courts
all those diversity cases where the defendants resided in more
states than one (whether or not the Strawbridge rule of complete
diversity is satisfied) and remand for exclusive state court determination all cases where the defendants reside in a single state.
Finally, substantially all special venue and process statutes will
be eliminated as will all reference to state laws governing service
of process. One uniform scheme of venue and process will govern all
actions in the federal courts.
119. For strong pleas for changes along the general lines suggested here
for both federal and state cases, see Foster, Place of Trial--InterstateAppli-

cation of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 Haav. L. REv. 41 (1930);
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-the Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution,
45 COL. L. :REv. 1, 22-24 (1945).

